
The 12-day Israel-Iran war: China’s response and its implications
As missiles rained down on Iranian nuclear sites and the specter of regional escalation loomed large, China’s response underscored its ambition to shape global affairs while simultaneously exposing the constraints of that ambition. This conflict became a revealing stress test for Beijing’s Middle East strategy, its role in global diplomacy, and the coherence of what some have described as an emergent “Axis of Upheaval” between China, Russia, and Iran.
At a surface level, China’s response was swift and aligned with its broader foreign policy posture. It issued strong condemnations of Israel’s preemptive strikes, called for an immediate cease-fire, and launched a flurry of diplomatic activity at the United Nations. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s denunciation of Israeli aggression as a violation of international law and President Xi Jinping’s subsequent calls for de-escalation framed China as a responsible power defending global stability.
China’s diplomatic posture: High rhetoric, low risk
China’s performance during the Israel-Iran conflict fit squarely within its own version of “active non-alignment.” By condemning Israel and calling for peace, Beijing reinforced its image as a responsible international actor — committed to sovereignty, non-intervention, and the rule of law. It used the UN Security Council to amplify these positions, joining Russia and Pakistan in demanding an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. This line of action allowed China to take the moral high ground, especially in contrast to the United States, whose airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were seen by many as escalatory and destabilizing.
Yet there was no serious attempt to mediate between Israel and Iran beyond formal pronouncements. Despite its 25-year strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and a desire to maintain access to Iranian energy, Beijing offered nothing that might alter the conflict’s trajectory. Unlike the US, China did not mobilize allies or offer security guarantees. Nor did it leverage its economic relationships with either party in an effort to force de-escalation. While reiterating familiar principles, President Xi’s “four-point proposal” failed to present a clear path to de-escalation and was imbalanced in its attribution of blame, undercutting Beijing’s claim to neutrality.
To be sure, the entrenched hostility, calculations, and objectives of both Israel and Iran may have rendered any such overture from Beijing futile. Still, this reveals the gap between China’s aspirations to global leadership and its reluctance to become entangled in security commitments that could damage its core interests, particularly with the Gulf Arab monarchies and major global markets.
The contrast between US resolve and China’s rhetorical diplomacy will not be lost on regional actors. While China promotes a vision of multipolarity rooted in restraint and development, it is the US, despite its many strategic overextensions, that remains capable of altering battlefield realities. This asymmetry raises an uncomfortable question for Beijing: can a power that not only refrains from bold action in times of crisis but also lacks the operational experience, trusted partnerships, and crisis-management tools to shape outcomes credibly claim global leadership?
Energy security and strategic exposure in the Strait of Hormuz
A central concern for China in any Middle Eastern conflict is the vulnerability of energy supplies. Around 40% of its oil imports originate from the region, and nearly 20% of global oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The war briefly raised the specter of an Iranian blockade, prompting swift statements from Beijing warning against “regional turmoil” impacting global economic development.
The war validated a key tenet of China’s energy strategy: its interests are vulnerable but not fully exposed to Middle Eastern shocks. Iran’s choice not to close the Strait of Hormuz — likely recognizing it would harm itself as much as its adversaries — reassured Chinese planners about regional rationality amid tension. This reinforced China’s push to diversify energy routes, including overland pipelines through Central Asia and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The conflict may have also rekindled interest in the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a project delayed by pricing disputes and Beijing’s caution over dependence on Russian energy. This logistical redundancy has become central to China’s national security.
Still, the conflict highlighted how energy security remains China’s soft underbelly in global crises. Although Beijing has made significant progress in driving advances in the development and use of renewable energy technology, particularly in the field of transportation, other sectors such as petrochemicals and heavy industry will need oil for feedstock for the foreseeable future. For as long as its economy depends so heavily on Middle Eastern oil, China will remain exposed to volatility it cannot control, which is an uncomfortable reality for a power seeking to insulate itself from US-dominated maritime routes.
The limits of the “Axis of Upheaval”
If the Israel-Iran conflict served as a litmus test for the strength of non-Western alliances, it revealed significant fractures. Much has been made of the supposed axis between Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran, a loose coalition viewed by Western analysts as a potential counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet this war highlighted the opportunistic nature of these ties. China and Russia condemned Israel but offered Iran little substantive support.
Russia’s reluctance to offer stronger support for Tehran, underscored by President Vladimir Putin’s remark that “Israel is almost a Russian-speaking country,” highlighted the ambivalence at the heart of Moscow’s regional posture. China, too, kept its distance, revealing that strategic partnerships are not alliances and that shared grievances with the West are not the same as shared objectives.
Indeed, Iran’s isolation during the war was telling. It had no military allies willing to intervene, no economic partners capable of shielding it from sanctions or strikes, and no diplomatic champions able to deter US or Israeli action. This is a sobering reminder that the so-called Axis of Upheaval is brittle, built on transactional interests rather than cohesive security architecture. For China, it serves as both a cautionary tale and a justification for its preference for limited entanglements.
What emerges is a pattern of strategic hedging whereby China positions itself to benefit from US overreach and regional instability while doing just enough diplomatically to maintain a veneer of neutrality. This hedging may preserve flexibility, but it also imposes ceilings on Chinese influence. In Iran and Israel alike, Beijing is likely seen not as a decisive actor, but as a distant opportunist.
Iran: A weakened partner, but a strategic asset
Beijing’s relationship with Tehran is best understood through the lens of bounded opportunism. For years, China has been Iran’s economic lifeline, especially amid Western sanctions. Yet this relationship never fulfilled its potential. Deep mistrust, internal dysfunction in Iran, and China’s desire to preserve ties with the Arab Gulf states have limited cooperation. The war reinforced these limitations. Iran found itself unable to leverage its relationship with China for tangible support, diplomatic or otherwise.
The conflict brought some benefits to Beijing. Looser US sanctions enforcement may soon let China buy more discounted Iranian oil. Iran’s growing isolation opens opportunities for expanded Chinese investment in reconstruction and infrastructure, especially as Western firms hesitate. A similar pattern unfolded in Iraq, where Chinese firms capitalized on Western caution to dominate oilfield development and infrastructure projects. Crucially, Iran’s military setbacks and increased distrust of the US lessen chances of rapprochement with the West, reassuring China of Iran’s continued, if limited, role in its geopolitical orbit.
China’s reluctance — or inability — to act decisively in Middle Eastern crises, despite growing economic interests and rhetorical commitments to regional stability, raises questions about its future role in the region. For governments balancing between Western security assurances and Chinese economic ties, Beijing’s inaction may cast doubt on its reliability in times of crisis, weakening its appeal as an alternative to the US or other established powers. More broadly, for a country seeking to shape a “new global order,” the failure to support even close partners during periods of instability risks stalling China’s push for multipolarity, reinforcing perceptions of Beijing as a limited actor — economically influential but strategically constrained.
China-Israel ties: Tech, tension, and strategic drift
China’s relations with Israel have been on a downward trajectory since before the Gaza war in late 2023. US pressure led the Israeli government to curtail Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors like high-tech and port infrastructure. Beijing’s increasingly vocal criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza amid the war there further strained ties, and the June 2025 conflict with Iran only made things worse. China’s harsh rebuke of Israel’s attacks placed it squarely against one of Washington’s closest allies.
Despite political tensions, pragmatic economic engagement may endure. Israeli tech firms and entrepreneurs, ever pragmatic, may continue to pursue Chinese capital and markets, especially if US venture funding tightens. But the era of expansive Sino-Israeli cooperation appears to be over. For China, this may not be an urgent loss. Israel’s strategic weight in Beijing’s global plans is limited, and maintaining credibility among Muslim-majority states, many of whom have grown disillusioned with the West, is arguably more valuable.
Diplomacy vs. power: The great-power contrast
The conflict offered a stage for the United States and China to present competing models of global leadership. The US, through its swift and forceful intervention, demonstrated its military capability, its willingness to protect allies, and its centrality in managing global crises. For all the controversy over its Middle East entanglements, Washington remains the region’s ultimate security guarantor, which is a reality that benefits not only US allies, but also countries like China whose interests are protected under the same umbrella.
China, by contrast, stayed true to its “non-interventionist” brand, emphasizing diplomacy, restraint, and multilateralism. This contrast is central to China’s global narrative: that it does not impose, it does not coerce, and it does not entangle. This posture resonates in parts of the Global South, where China’s appeal lies in its promise of development without interference. But in moments of crisis, its lack of decisive action — whether due to constraints or choice — raises doubts about its effectiveness in shaping outcomes. China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), with its emphasis on “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security,” appears ill-fitted for an environment where hard power still dictates terms.
China’s muted role during the crisis also casts doubt on the coherence of its broader global vision. The same initiatives it touts (i.e., the GSI, Belt and Road Initiative, and Global Development Initiative) require stability and credibility to succeed. When China fails to uphold either, especially during high-profile crises, it risks undermining the very legitimacy of the alternative order it claims to champion.
The renewed US focus on the Middle East may delay the emergence of a post-American order, but it also affords China strategic breathing room in the Indo-Pacific. While some Asian allies may interpret Washington’s intervention as reaffirmation of its security commitments, others could welcome the temporary easing of great-power tensions. This interlude allows China to consolidate regional influence through economic engagement and diplomatic outreach, positioning itself as a stabilizing alternative to military-led order.
Implications for nonproliferation: Caution and complexity
Perhaps the most enduring consequence of the war is its impact on the global nonproliferation landscape. The destruction of key Iranian nuclear facilities, albeit without regime change, creates a fork in the road. One scenario is grim: that Iran, feeling betrayed by negotiations and exposed to attack, accelerates its push for nuclear weapons as the only credible deterrent. In this case, regional rivals like Saudi Arabia may follow suit, triggering a cascade of proliferation risks.
The other scenario, preferred by Washington and cautiously endorsed by Beijing, is that the strikes, having purportedly forestalled Iran’s nuclear ambitions, create space for a new, more stringent diplomatic agreement. But the odds of this are slim. Presumably, Tehran now views negotiations as a trap, with both Israeli and US leaders signaling regime-change ambitions. Trust has collapsed, and China, despite its calls for renewed diplomacy, lacks the influence — or credibility — to bring Iran back to the table.
For China, this deepens the paradox at the heart of its foreign policy. Beijing wants a stable Middle East, access to energy, and a rules-based global order. But it is neither willing nor able to enforce the rules, and no doubt its partners increasingly see through the rhetorical smoke. In Tehran, the memory of China’s passivity will linger. In Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, China’s risk aversion will be noted. And in Washington, Beijing’s limitations will inform future calculations.
Conclusion: An opportunity, a constraint, and a reckoning
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran was more than a regional flare-up. It was a pivotal moment that revealed the fault lines of emerging global power dynamics. For China, it was a reminder that diplomacy without leverage cannot shape outcomes, that partnerships without trust are fragile, and that ambitions of global leadership must be matched with strategic commitment.
And yet China is not without gains. The conflict pulled US attention back to the Middle East, potentially easing pressure in the Indo-Pacific. It expanded China’s ability to engage economically with Iran. It allowed Beijing to reaffirm its opposition to unilateral force while avoiding the costs of involvement. But these are tactical wins, not strategic ones.
The war did not redefine China’s role in the Middle East but rather clarified it. China is a commercial partner, a diplomatic voice, and a systemic rival to the West. But it is not yet, and perhaps never will be, a security actor of consequence in the region. That role still belongs, for better or worse, to the US. For the Arab Gulf states and others, the lesson is stark. When the missiles fly, it is not China that answers the call. And for China, the message is equally clear: to fulfill its ambition of shaping a new global order, it must be willing to use its diplomatic capital decisively, take calculated security risks, and demonstrate that its influence can shape outcomes in moments of crisis.
John Calabrese is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) and book review editor for The Middle East Journal.
Photo by Lintao Zhang/Pool/AFP via Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.

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